SJC Rules on Community Preservation Act Case
Beveridge & Diamond, P.C. - Massachsuetts Environmental, Land Use & Real Estate Alerts, 2008
On October 24, 2008, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a long awaited ruling in the case of Seideman & others v. City of Newton, 452 Mass. 472 (2008). The Seideman case involved a suit brought by ten taxpayers in the City of Newton (“City”) challenging the expenditure of funds under the Community Preservation Act (CPA). The taxpayers alleged that the proposed CPA projects did not fall within the purview of the statute and, therefore, were ineligible for funding under the CPA. The case involved funding for improvements to existing parks that had been used by the City for recreation purposes since before the CPA was enacted. The SJC found for the taxpayers.
On May 15, 2006, the City approved an appropriation of $765,825 of CPA funds to cover the first year of project costs associated with improvements to two existing parks. The improvements included, among other things, reorganizing existing park facilities, building new tennis courts, reconfiguring and relocating basketball courts, improving landscaping, adding new fencing, creating new paths, installing water fountains, and preserving ball fields. There was no dispute that the parks had been used by the City for recreation purposes since before the passage of the CPA. Two questions were before the court: (1) whether CPA funds could be used for improvements to parks that were in existence prior to the enactment of the CPA; and (2) whether the proposed improvements constituted “preservation” of recreation land rather than “rehabilitation or restoration.”
Under the CPA , funds may be appropriated “for the acquisition, creation and preservation of land for recreational use” and for the “rehabilitation or restoration of …land for recreational use…that is acquired or created as provided in this section.” G.L.c. 44B, § 5(b)(2). The taxpayers argued that because the recreation land existed before the enactment of the CPA, it was not being “acquired or created” with CPA funds and, therefore, the appropriation was invalid. The taxpayers also argued that the proposed improvements constituted “rehabilitation or restoration” and therefore CPA funds could not be expended unless the recreation land was originally acquired or created with CPA funds. The City countered that the word “creation” in the CPA statute should be broadly construed to include the “creation of new recreational uses within existing parks that would make the areas open and accessible to new groups of users.” Seideman at p. 477 In addition, the City characterized the improvements as “preservation” and not “rehabilitation or restoration” arguing that the improvements go well beyond mere maintenance.
The court dismissed the City’s argument that the word “creation,” which is undefined in the CPA, should include the creation of new recreational uses within existing parks. The court found the fact that the parks were in existence prior to the enactment of the CPA to be significant and relied upon the usual meaning of the word creation, which it did not find applicable to pre-existing recreation land. Likewise, relying upon the statutory definition of the word “preservation,” the court found that the extensive improvements and upgrades planned for the parks did not constitute “preservation” of the recreation land. Instead the court held that the improvements were “rehabilitation or restoration” and, therefore, CPA funds could not be used to fund the improvements because the parks had not been acquired or created with CPA funds.
The SJC’s ruling clarifies this outstanding issue, but may leave some communities with appropriated funds that can no longer be used for the purposes for which they were appropriated. Legislation has been filed to allow the use of CPA funds for improvements to recreation land that was not acquired or created with CPA funds, but it has not yet passed.
For more information, please contact Deborah A. Eliason at deliason@bdlaw.com.
