FAA Proposes New Regulation to Enable Companies to Request Drone Flight Restrictions Near Fixed-Site, Critical Infrastructure Facilities

Key Takeaways

• Comments due July 6, 2026. Under its proposed 14 C.F.R. Part 74, operators and proprietors of fixed-site (permanent, non-mobile), critical infrastructure (defined by statute and regulation) facilities could request the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restrict unmanned aircraft (drone) operations near such facilities.
• FAA-Approved Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions (UAFR) would define airspace in which drone operations would be restricted, subject to narrow exceptions. UAFRs would not physically impede drone operations or empower facility operators and proprietors to interfere with drone operations through detection or mitigation measures, though those with lawful independent authority could do so.
• Companies across a broad range of sectors could apply for UAFR. Potentially eligible facilities include: energy production, transmission, and distribution facilities; oil refineries; chemical facilities; transportation (rail, aviation, marine, and pipeline) facilities; commercial facilities that draw large crowds (e.g., for entertainment, shopping, lodging); and facilities in the communications, information technologies, critical manufacturing, emergency services, food and agriculture, healthcare and public health, nuclear, water, and wastewater.
• Potential environmental impacts and public safety threats from drone attacks are central considerations. UAFR applicants would need to demonstrate a safety or security need, that the facility meets certain sector-specific criteria, and the potential effects of a drone attack, collision, or disruption would have a regional or national-level “debilitating impact.” FAA would consider environmental consequences and effects on communities surrounding the facility, including releases of hazardous substances, fires, explosions, contamination events, or disruptions to critical environmental control systems.

Background

On May 6, 2026, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to implement Section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, as subsequently amended, consistent with Executive Order 14305 – Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty, which directs the FAA to establish a process “to prohibit or restrict, including temporarily, the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close proximity to” certain fixed site facilities. 

The FAA proposes implementing this mandate by establishing a new regulatory regime (49 C.F.R. Part 74) under which facility owners and operators could apply for a UFAR that would prohibit or restrict drone operations in airspace in the vicinity of their facilities.

FAA’s proposal comes in a context in which commercial, official (e.g., law enforcement), and recreational use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly referred to as “drones,” is rapidly expanding in the U.S., presenting tremendous opportunities but also new potential security, economic, environmental, and public health threats. Congress has directed the FAA to integrate drones into the National Airspace System (NAS) (see 49 U.S. Code § 44802), requiring the agency to balance the need to address such threats, the public’s right to operate drones in the NAS, and the preservation of airspace efficiency. 

Purpose and Legal Effect of UAFRs

A UAFR would clearly define the airspace in which operations of drones would be restricted or prohibited. The primary purpose of a UAFR is to notify drone users that they may not operate in certain areas and that doing so would pose risks to security and safety. Penalties for violating the UAFR would be rather severe, with possible criminal penalties, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46307; civil penalties; and revocations of certifications, ratings, and authorizations issued by the FAA.

Importantly, a UAFR itself would not physically interfere with drone operations or authorize other parties (including operators and proprietors of affected facilities) to do so, e.g., by deploying drone detection and mitigation systems. UAFRs will, however, help parties – including law enforcement agencies and facility operators and proprietors – distinguish between lawful and unlawful drone operations. A UAFR would not prevent parties from exercising separate, lawful authorities to operate such detection and mitigation systems.

Eligibility

Under the FAA’s proposal, only fixed-site (permanent, non-mobile) facilities that meet the definition of “critical infrastructure” in 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e), which includes 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified in the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (listed below), may apply for a UAFR. In addition, facilities in these sectors would need to:

• meet specific criteria designed to ensure UAFRs are available only to those facilities at which drone operations above or near them present safety or security threats;
• have at least one critical asset or component that is vulnerable to drone operations;
• have deployed specified “physical security” measures (including restricted access and security monitoring that includes the ability to receive Remote Identification messages from unmanned aircraft); and
• demonstrate that “damage or disruption to, or destruction of, the facility would have a regional or nationallevel debilitating impact.” 

Other Minimum Requirements for Obtaining a UAFR

In addition to meeting the eligibility requirements outlined above, applicants for a UAFR would also need to:

• demonstrate the need for the UAFR, including the vulnerabilities that drone operations may exploit and how vulnerabilities may affect the facility’s operations and mission, and aviation safety, protection of persons and property on the ground, national security, or homeland security;
• provide security and incident response plans to address identified vulnerabilities and consequences; and
• describe potential impacts a UAFR may have on manned or unmanned aircraft users, including costs, disruptions, or other negative effects of rerouting aircraft.

In addition, applicants must provide information needed to facilitate the FAA’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), including identification of sensitive land uses and resources specified in the proposal.

The Environmental Intersection with UAFRs

Although the NPRM is framed primarily as a national security measure, the proposed rule raises important environmental considerations. A notable feature of the proposal is the substantial overlap between facilities viewed as potential national security or homeland security targets and facilities whose disruption could result in significant environmental consequences. Depending on the facilities involved, consequences could include:

• releases of hazardous substances;
• air emissions events;
• explosions and fires;
• contamination of soil, groundwater, or surface water;
• disruptions to pollution-control systems; and
• interruptions in waste management operations.

For many operators, the proposed rule therefore sits at the intersection of security and environmental risk management. The rule could create a valuable new mechanism to deter unauthorized drone activity and reduce risks associated with surveillance, disruption, sabotage, or accidental incursions. Companies operating sensitive infrastructure may view UAFRs as a meaningful addition to their broader physical and cyber security programs.

Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Although the proposal originates from national security and aviation safety concerns, its reach extends across numerous sectors of the U.S. economy.

The NPRM specifically references facilities associated with the following sectors (parentheticals paraphrase proposed sector-specific criteria):

• Chemical (facilities that use, manufacture, store, transport, possess, or deliver potentially dangerous chemicals above specified threshold quantities);
• Commercial Facilities (facilities like stadiums that have an annual attendance of 2.5 million, are open at least 120 days a year, and meet other criteria);
• Communications (includes certain broadcast network facilities, cellular tower and base stations, satellite uplink and downlink stations, and data center / internet exchange points);
• Critical Manufacturing (includes certain primary metal, machinery, electrical equipment, appliance, component, and transportation equipment manufacturing facilities);
• Dams (includes certain dams that provide hydroelectric power or drinking water and locks);
• Defense Industrial Base (includes Department of Defense contractors and subcontractors involved in certain activities related to aircraft assembly, missile defense, shipbuilding, nuclear modernization, and space launch vehicles, among others);
• Emergency Services (includes state and federal correctional facilities);
• Energy (includes large power plants, oil refineries, and natural gas processing plants);
• Financial Services (includes certain financial service corporate headquarters, high cash-volume facilities, and trading floors and financial exchanges);
• Food and Agriculture (not defined, “reserved”);
• Government Services and Facilities (certain high-risk, high-security government facilities with a national security role and critical mission-oriented service);
• Healthcare and Public Health (Level I and Pediatric Level I trauma centers with helipads);
• Information Technology (includes certain data center facilities);
• Nuclear Reactor, Materials, and Waste (includes currently operating nuclear power plants; facilities that convert, enrich, fabricate, or reprocess nuclear material; certain former nuclear power plants, isotope production facilities, and nuclear research and test reactors);
• Transportation Systems (includes certain rail facilities, intermodal transportation hubs, pipeline pump and compressor stations, electric substations, highway bridges or tunnels, facilities regulated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act; and,
• Water and Wastewater Systems (not defined, “reserved”).

Next Steps

Stakeholders should submit comments by the July 6, 2026, deadline.

FAA is seeking comments on several issues, including:

• Whether FAA should limit eligibility for UAFRs to facilities within the 16 sectors identified in the proposed rule. FAA requests information regarding additional facility types or sectors that may warrant protection, the minimum criteria FAA should apply to determine eligibility for those additional sectors, the vulnerabilities those facilities face from unmanned aircraft operations, the consequences if those vulnerabilities were exploited, the approximate number of facilities that would meet any proposed eligibility criteria, and how the use of UAFRs would address these concerns.
• Whether FAA should authorize additional categories of unmanned aircraft operations within an approved UAFR. FAA seeks information regarding the types of operations that should be permitted, the justification for allowing those operations, the economic impacts that restrictions may impose on commercial drone operators, the information operators should provide to demonstrate credibility and that they do not present a security risk, and any technological or procedural safeguards that should apply, such as remote identification, coordination with facility operators, or coordination with law enforcement.

Stakeholders may consider commenting on:

• The ability of facility operators and proprietors to continue conducting their own drone operations within airspace subject to a UAFR. Many organizations increasingly rely on drones for infrastructure inspections, surveying, security monitoring, emissions monitoring, environmental compliance activities, asset management, emergency response, and other operational functions.
• FAA’s proposal requires applicants to submit security and incident response plans and avoid duplicating other incident response requirements (like those under the Clean Air Act Risk Management Program). Such plans may also contain sensitive information, which will need to be safeguarded under whatever approach FAA adopts.
• Whether FAA's proposed framework appropriately accounts for facilities where unauthorized drone activity could create significant environmental risks, including releases of hazardous substances, fires, explosions, disruptions to pollution-control systems, or other environmental incidents.
• Whether their sector-specific criteria for obtaining a UAFR need to be adjusted (e.g., to broaden the availability to facilities within a sector).

For more than 30 years, B&D’s Transportation practice has crafted effective regulatory, compliance, rulemaking, and litigation strategies for the aviation industry. We represent passenger and cargo air carriers, engine and equipment manufacturers, North America’s principal aviation trade association, and aerospace/defense sector leaders on matters involving the range of environmental and health and safety laws and regulations impacting their operations.