SCOTUS: FIFRA Preempts State Failure-to-Warn Tort Claims

On June 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068, that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims alleging that a pesticide manufacturer failed to include a warning not required on its U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-approved labeling. The Court reversed a Missouri decision upholding a jury verdict based on Monsanto’s alleged failure to include a cancer warning on Roundup and provided clarity to a preemption issue confronted by courts hearing product liability suits across the country.

Key Takeaways

In a 7–2 opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), which bars states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” federal requirements, preempts state tort claims alleging that a pesticide manufacturer failed to provide warnings that EPA has not required on the product’s approved label, at least where EPA has affirmatively evaluated the risk. Generally, the decision strengthens preemption defenses for FIFRA-regulated products where plaintiffs allege injury based on a pesticide label’s failure to include warnings or statements not required by EPA.

Background

Every pesticide (with limited exemptions) must be registered under FIFRA based on EPA’s determination that the product will not cause unreasonable adverse effects to human health or the environment. In making that determination, EPA evaluates a wide range of studies submitted by applicants under detailed testing guidelines and data requirements. Critically, registration also requires EPA to review and approve the language that appears on pesticide labels, and FIFRA prohibits the distribution or sale of pesticides with labeling that contains any statement that is “false or misleading in any particular.” EPA is further required to review each pesticide registration every 15 years in a process called registration review. During registration review, EPA assesses the existing science and, where it determines it is necessary, requires registrants to conduct additional research to ensure that the pesticide continues to serve its function without unreasonable adverse effects to human health and the environment.

Roundup is a glyphosate-based herbicide. EPA first registered glyphosate in 1974 and has periodically reviewed glyphosate since then, including as recently as 2020. Those reviews have reinforced EPA’s determination that glyphosate is “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” Consistent with those determinations, EPA has never required a cancer warning on Roundup labels. Nevertheless, the plaintiff in Durnell—in addition to plaintiffs in other cases around the country—alleged that long-term Roundup use caused cancer and that Monsanto should have warned users of cancer risk.

The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Monsanto’s FIFRA preemption defense in the case below, further deepening a split among state and federal appellate courts over whether FIFRA preempts such failure-to-warn claims. Recognizing the importance of this issue and the need for clarity, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in January 2026.

The SCOTUS Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the Missouri Court of Appeals decision, holding that FIFRA’s text plainly preempts tort claims that would impose liability for failing to include cautionary language that EPA has not required for a product’s label. These claims, the Court explained, run afoul of FIFRA’s prohibition against any state labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” FIFRA requirements. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). Allowing litigants to bring these failure-to-warn claims “would require [a manufacturer]. . .to add a warning to its labels” that EPA has neither approved nor required. The majority grounded this conclusion in EPA’s detailed regulations governing pesticide labeling and mandate that manufacturers must use the labeling approved by EPA. If tort relief were available, plaintiffs could undermine Congress’s goal of creating uniform national labeling requirements and EPA’s authority to make determinations regarding the necessity and accuracy of pesticide labeling.

The Court also highlighted how EPA’s continuing post-registration oversight authority ensures that product labeling remains up to date and warns of known risks. That authority includes registrants’ obligation to report information regarding unreasonable adverse effects under 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2), EPA’s authority to require additional data under 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B), and EPA’s authority to cancel or suspend registrations under Sections 136d(b) and (c). Consistent with 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g), EPA also must review each pesticide registration at least every 15 years.

Industry Implications

Durnell offers pesticide registrants a strong preemption defense in failure-to-warn suits seeking warnings inconsistent with EPA-approved labels. When the Supreme Court last addressed FIFRA preemption in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), it adopted a “parallel requirement” reading of the statute under which state-law requirements—including common law duties—equivalent to FIFRA’s labeling standards are not preempted. Durnell distinguishes Bates, explaining that the earlier case concerned efficacy—rather than precautionary—labeling statements. In the Court’s view, EPA’s extensive regulation and review of labels’ precautionary language carries greater preemptive force than FIFRA’s different approach to efficacy claims. Companies facing pending or threatened litigation should thus assess the extent to which EPA considered or addressed the labeling statements a plaintiff is targeting in the registration process.

For stakeholders throughout the agricultural supply chain, the decision may reduce litigation risk tied to FIFRA-approved labels, but it does not eliminate it entirely. The Court noted, for example, that states under 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) may regulate the sale or use of EPA-registered pesticides, including by banning pesticides within their borders. The Court also did not address preemption of tort claims targeting aspects of a product other than its labeling.

For registrants, the decision also underscores the importance of maintaining a strong administrative record before EPA. The Court placed substantial weight on EPA’s scientific review, label approval, and continuing authority to require labeling changes when new safety information emerges.

What Companies Should Do Now

Pesticide registrants and other stakeholders should review pending product-liability claims for potential preemption defenses in light of Durnell. They should also assess the degree to which other state-required label language, point-of-sale warnings, website statements, or marketing materials could be characterized as pesticide “labeling” or as inconsistent with EPA-approved labels.

Beveridge & Diamond’s Pesticides, Toxic Tort, Product Stewardship, and Litigation teams are available to help clients evaluate the decision’s implications for product labeling, state warning requirements, litigation strategy, and EPA engagement.